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“Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to
take you in.”
— Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, 1914.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota statute defines a residential tenant as a person who is
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a written or
oral lease or contract requiring the payment of money or an
exchange of services. 2 In Cocchiarella v. Driggs,3 the Minnesota
Supreme Court expanded the statutory definition of residential
tenant by finding someone occupies residential rental property by
either holding actual physical possession or holding the present
legal right of possession.4 The Cocchiarella majority repudiated a
narrower view that the plain meaning of the controlling statutes
requires actual possession.5 Two housing court referees, a trial court
judge, three appeals court judges, and even two justices from the
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the majority’s expansive
interpretation.6
While the Cocchiarella majority provided a good outcome to a
lockout action for one particular tenant victimized by an
unscrupulous landlord, the court’s opinion expanded the statutory
definition of residential tenant for all types of landlord-tenant cases
in Minnesota. 7 Moreover, the majority’s present legal right of
possession approach used legal fiction by extending the meaning of
tenancy to any period of time someone holds the right to occupy
residential rental property, even if they have never physically
occupied the property. 8 This article (1) advocates a return to a
narrower actual physical possession requirement–at least as applied
to lockout actions; (2) touches on how the court’s reasoning
continued a perilous trend of using dictionaries to surmise plain
1. ROBERT FROST, NORTH OF BOSTON 20 (Henry Holt & Co., 2d ed., reprt.
1922) (1914).
2. MINN. STAT. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017).
3. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016).
4. Id. at 628.
5. Id.
6. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting).
7. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016); MINN. STAT. §
504B.001, subd. 1 (2017) (stating definitions apply to entire 504B chapter).
8. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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meaning; and (3) explores how the legal fiction of present legal right
of possession has impacted the practice of law in Minnesota by
looking at selected cases from the state’s busiest landlord-tenant
forum, the Hennepin County Housing Court.9
II.

BACKGROUND

In Cocchiarella, a tenant looking for a new apartment filled out
paperwork and paid a security deposit. However, the landlord
changed his mind several times about when the apartment would be
ready for the new tenant to move in. Finally growing tired after two
weeks of waiting, the tenant filed a lockout action claiming the
landlord unlawfully excluded her from her new apartment, which
the tenant had never physically occupied.
This section will begin with a brief overview of self-help
evictions, discuss what lockout actions look like in Minnesota, and
explore the details of the Cocchiarella v Driggs lockout action.
A. A Quick History of Self-Help Evictions
“A man's home is his castle – for where shall he be safe if not in
his house?”10 The home as castle dictum is often cited in support of
self-defense in criminal law,11 but its context speaks to the need to
respect the privacy of others so we may all feel safe in our own
9. See JAMES W. HIBBS, ANALYSIS OF THE 2015 POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD
ESTIMATES
(2016), https://mn.gov/admin/assets/analysis-2015-populationhousehold-estimates-msdc-nov2016_tcm36-270612.pdf;
QuickFacts:
Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ quickfacts/MN (last
visited Feb. 10, 2018); QuickFacts: Hennepin County, Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/hennepincountyminnesota/POP060210 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018)
(indicating Hennepin County is home to approximately 22% of the entire
population of the state of Minnesota and Hennepin County contains nearly 30%
of total rental units in the state).
10 . JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 81
(James Cockcroft ed.,1894) (quoting Edward Coke, an English barrister and
judge considered to be one of the greatest Elizabethan and Jacobean era jurists,
from the Third Institutes of the Lawes of England, part of a set of documents
which laid the foundation for the development of common law).
11. See States That Have Stand Your Ground Laws, FINDLAW.COM,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/states-that-have-stand-yourground-laws.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
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homes.12 The act of illegally forcing a tenant out of their home is
known as lockout, ouster, illegal eviction, or self-help eviction.13
However, what lies at the center are the illegal actions of a landlord
in removing a tenant from rental property without resorting to the
judicial process.14
Removing a tenant using illegal means can occur by many
different methods. 15 These methods can include removing the
tenant’s belongings from the property, 16 changing the locks,
removing windows or doors, or any other means a perverse mind
can imagine. 17 Landlords may also illegally cut off or reduce
essential services like heat, running water, hot water, electricity, or
gas.18
Early in the legal history of England and the United States, the
law was not concerned with how landlords chose to evict tenants.
Self-help evictions (i.e. lockouts)19 became a “popular and efficient
method” to get rid of tenants. 20 “However, after centuries of
12. The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: An Englishman's Home is His
Castle, PHRASES.ORG.UK, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/an-englishmanshome-is-his-castle.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
13. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.107 (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE. LAWS, 1972); supra note 18, at 856–57.
14. See Id.
15. ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MYRON KOVE, 1 REAL ESTATE LEASING PRACTICE
MANUAL § 38:107 (Oct. 2017).
16. Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. 2014)
(stating that when a tenant returned from work, she discovered the landlord had
thrown away all her possession into dumpsters filled with water from rain and
melting snow because she had “abandoned the apartment.”)
17 . Craig Donofrio, Could These Be the 6 Worst Landlords of All Time?
REALTOR.COM (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/worstlandlords-ever/ (describing one landlord with a long list of crazy rules tenants had
to memorize; a landlord so bad, he inspired art; a landlord who tried to disqualify
current tenants by drastically raising the income requirements; a landlord whose
lead paint was so bad it formed thick clouds of toxic dust throughout the halls; a
landlord who removed doors and windows during a cold Boston winter; and two
landlords who terrorized tenants, including by sawing a hole through the floor of
an occupied apartment from below).
18. Shannon Holmberg, Note, Squashing the Squatting Crisis: A Proposal to
Reform Summary Eviction and Improve Case Management Systems to Stop the
Squatter Supply, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 857 (2017). See also UNIF. RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.107.
19. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d
884. N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016).
20. See Holmberg, supra note 18, at 856–57 (citing infra note 156, at 774–76).
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unregulated evictions in England, and thereafter in the United
States, it became clear self-help measures contributed to severe
abuses by landlords as well as breaches of the peace.”21 Landlords
who resorted to self-help measures in evicting tenants generated
such a great risk of confrontation and violence that, since colonial
times, states’ legislatures and courts have sought to minimize those
risks by making it so tenants can only be removed from their homes
peaceably, through the judicial process.22
Most states have sought to end self-help evictions by enacting
statutes requiring the use of the judicial process to evict tenants.23
“Courts refer to cases brought under those statutes as ‘forcible entry
and detainer’ (FED) or ‘unlawful detainer’ (UD) actions.” 24
FED/UD actions require landlords to follow a series of formalities
to obtain a judicial determination allowing them to evict a tenant. 25
If a landlord does not strictly adhere to the required formalities,
FED/UD actions also provide judicial remedies to tenants who are
considered wrongfully ousted. 26 The judicial protections of
peaceable evictions extend to those who have stopped paying rent,27
those who hold over property after the end of a lease,28 and even
those occupying premises illegally, such as squatters or
trespassers.29
Today, most jurisdictions in the United States do not allow for
self-help evictions.30 Many statutes require suing tenants in court,
waiting for the judicial process to unfold, and waiting for the sheriff

21. See Holmberg, supra note 18, at 856 (citing infra note 156, at 776).
22. STATE OF CONN. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LANDLORD/TENANT
DISPUTES POLICE TRAINING MANUAL 4 (2009), http://www.ct.gov/cachm/lib/
cachm/Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State%27s_Attorney.pdf.
23. See Holmberg, supra note 18, at 856.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Marcia Stewart, Don't Lock Out or Freeze Out a Tenant — It's Illegal,
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/lock-out-tenant-illegal29799.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
28. Landlord-Tenant Law: An Overview, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/landlord-tenant_law (last visited Jan. 13,
2018).
29. See Shannon Dunn McCarthy, Squatting: Lifting the Heavy Burden to Evict
Unwanted Company, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 156, 174–75. (2013).
30. Landlord-Tenant Law, supra note 28.
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to enforce an eviction order. 31 Many jurisdictions recognize a
separate tort action for unlawful ousters (i.e. self-help evictions)
and/or criminalize the illegal removal of a tenant. 32 Therefore,
tenants who are illegally evicted or forced out of their homes enjoy
many protections against such unlawful, and often volatile,
conduct.33
B. What do Lockout Actions Look Like in Minnesota?
The illegal act of removing a tenant from their home without
resorting to the legal process is known as a lockout action in
Minnesota. 34 Minnesota statutes state that a lockout occurs
whenever a landlord tries to end a tenancy by: (1) intentionally
removing or excluding a tenant from the rental property; (2)
intentionally altering the electrical, heat, gas, or water services; or
(3) intentionally removing doors, windows, or locks. 35 A tenant
who has been locked out can ask a trial court for an order allowing
the tenant to retake possession of the rental property. 36 A tenant
starts a lockout action by filing a verified petition at the district court
in the county where the property is located.37 The petition must: (a)
describe “the premises and the landlord”; (b) state the specific “facts
and grounds which demonstrate the exclusion or removal was
illegal”; (c) state “that no writ of recovery and order to vacate has
issued”; and (d) ask for possession.38
Once a lockout petition is properly filed, the action becomes a
summary proceeding for emergency relief.39 “If it clearly appears
from the specific grounds and facts stated” in the tenant’s petition

31. Landlord-Tenant Law, supra note 28.
32. See Stewart, supra note 27.
33. See Stewart, supra note 27.
34. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 105.
35. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(a) (2017).
36. Landlords and Tenants: Rights and Responsibilities, OFF. MINN. ATT’Y
GEN. LORI SWANSON,
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/handbooks/lt/CH4.asp (last visited Jan.
19, 2018) [hereinafter Rights and Responsibilities].
37. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(b).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 5.
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the exclusion was unlawful, the court immediately issues an ex
parte order for the tenant to have possession of the premises.40
The ex parte order issued by the court can include several
important and powerful clauses. Such clauses include: (1) requiring
the tenant to pay security in an amount the court deems appropriate
“to pay all costs and damages the landlord may sustain if the order
is later found to have been obtained wrongfully”; 41 (2) directing
“the sheriff of the county where the premises are located” to execute
“the order by making an immediate demand for possession on the
landlord . . . or other person in charge of the premises”; 42 (3)
directing the sheriff that, “if the landlord does not comply with the
demand for possession, the officer may render whatever assistance
may be necessary to immediately place tenant in possession of the
premises”;43 and (4) directing the sheriff that if the landlord “cannot
be found, the officer shall immediately enter and place the . . .
tenant in possession”.44 The ex parte order may also schedule an
emergency hearing within a few days.45 At that hearing, the court
may grant additional relief including monetary damages up to three
times the tenant’s out-of-pocket costs resulting from the lockout and
attorney’s fees.46
Any appeal of the lockout order must be filed within ten days,
which is one of the shortest deadlines for the filing of an appeal
allowed under Minnesota law. 47 If a lease includes a provision
waiving the right to file a lockout action, such provision is void.48
The protections against unlawful lockouts extend to tenants
occupying property after a mortgage foreclosure or contract-for-

40. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c).
41. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(d).
42. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(e).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 36.
46. Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 36.
47. Compare Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 3 (2017) (stating an appeal of a
lockout order must be filed within 10 days), with Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01
(providing that, unless a different time is given in the controlling statute, the usual
timeline for the filing of an appeal in a civil action is 60 days).
48. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 4 (2017).
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deed cancellation.49 Any landlord who commits a lockout is also
guilty of a misdemeanor.50
C. The Cocchiarella v. Driggs Lockout Action
In late January 2014, Mary Cocchiarella saw a “for rent” sign
and contacted Donald Driggs, who informed her three units were
available to rent. 51 While viewing the units, Cocchiarella noticed
Driggs had personal property inside the unit Cocchiarella was
interested in renting.52 Despite presently occupying that particular
unit, Driggs agreed to rent it to Cocchiarella.53
On February 1, 2014, Cocchiarella met Driggs to fill out an
application and ask when she could begin to move in.54 Driggs said
it would take a couple of days because he needed to varnish the
floors.55 Cocchiarella again met Driggs on February 3, 2014, and
paid $2,400 in cash as her security deposit and first month’s rent.56
Driggs informed Cocchiarella the unit was not yet ready because he
was ill, so he asked her to come back the next day.57
When Cocchiarella returned the following day, Driggs asked her
to obtain a co-signer. 58 Cocchiarella returned later that same
evening with a roommate, who filled out a rental application. Driggs
informed them he needed a couple of days to remove his belongings
before they could move in.59 Two days later, Cocchiarella and her
roommate returned to ask Driggs when they could move in. 60
Driggs became angry and demanded they leave.61
49. Id. § 504B.375, subdiv.at subd. 6;. sSee also MINN. LEGAL SERVS. COAL,
TENANTS’
RIGHTS
IN
MINNESOTA
(14th
ed.,
2017),
https://www.lawhelpmn.org/files/1765CC5E-1EC9-4FC4-65EC957272D8A04E/attachments/070F8942-D0D5-D0CB-BEC96D77718B6B73/tenantsreprint-2017.pdf.
50. Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.225 (2017), . See also Minn. Stat. § 609.606 (2017).
51. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 623 (Minn. 2016).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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On February 10, 2014, Driggs left Cocchiarella a voicemail
asking her to return to the apartment so Driggs could return her
money. 62 After meeting Cocchiarella, Driggs again changed his
mind.63 This time, Driggs said he needed a couple of days to remove
his belongings so they could move in later that week.64
On February 11, 2014, Cocchiarella left Driggs a voicemail
saying that unless he provided her keys for immediate move-in, she
would file a lockout petition with the court.65 Driggs did not give
Cocchiarella the keys, so Cocchiarella filed a lockout petition. 66
Two different housing court referees declined to grant
Cocchiarella’s lockout petition for lack of standing.67 The referees
found Cocchiarella lacked standing because only a residential
tenant may bring a lockout action. 68 As defined by statute, a
residential tenant is a person who is occupying residential premises
and Cocchiarella had never actually moved in.69
A district court judge reached the same conclusion and affirmed
the housing court’s findings.70 A three-judge panel of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion and affirmed the
district court’s findings.71 Only when the case got to the Minnesota
Supreme Court did the issue become murky.
The Cocchiarella majority found the plain meaning of
residential tenant extended to anyone holding a present legal right
of possession, even if they had never physically occupied the rental
property. 72 The majority’s interpretation relied on different
dictionaries to find the plain meaning of ‘occupying’ blended with

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally id. at 622–24; Petition for Hearing, Cocchiarella v. Driggs,
27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Feb. 14, 2014); Order-other,
Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed May
1, 2014).
68. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623.
69. Id.
70. Bob Collins, Justice is Blind, but it Can Read a Dictionary, MPR NEWS
CRIME AND JUST. BLOG (Sep. 8, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.mprnews.org/
newscut/2015/09/justice-is-blind-but-it-can-read-a-dictionary/.
71. See supra note 70.
72. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627–28.
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technical meaning within landlord-tenant law. 73 Because of this
blended meaning, a residential tenant is now defined as anyone who
either physically occupies rental premises or has a present legal
right of possession.74
III.

ANALYSIS

Minnesota statute defines a residential tenant as a person who is
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a written or
oral lease or contract requiring the payment of money or an
exchange of services.75 The crux of the Cocchiarella case became
what does it mean to ‘occupy’ a residential dwelling?
A. Why Didn’t the Court Heed the Warnings from Within Its Own
Chambers?
Writing in dissent of the Cocchiarella majority, Justice
Anderson pointed out that Cocchiarella did not have a written lease
and, more importantly, did not even have any agreement about a
move-in date or the effective date of any lease agreement. 76 Under
his narrower interpretation, a residential tenancy begins at actual
possession.77 This means that to occupy is defined as the moment
actual physical occupancy begins. This was the same interpretation
that every judicial officer below also adopted and found to be
mandated by the plain meaning of the word ‘occupying.’78
By contrast, the majority disposed of the lack of agreements by
applying the presumption that, when reviewing a motion to dismiss,
all facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and construe
all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of Cocchiarella,
as the nonmoving party. 79 The dissent also concedes this
presumption binds him to consider the matter as if there was an oral
lease. 80 Under the majority’s broader interpretation, a residential
tenancy starts the moment actual physical occupancy begins and
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 625–26.
Id.
Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017).
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 628 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 622-24.
Id. at 629, fn. 1 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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also extends to anytime someone holds present legal right of
possession even if they have never lived there.81
Justice Anderson warned the majority their broader
interpretation can introduce a host of potential problems, especially
when several people claim to hold the present legal right of
possession.82 These warnings only scratched the surface of potential
problems as will be discussed in more detail later. What becomes
apparent from comparing the reasoning of the Cocchiarella
majority and dissent is that the Court was interpreting statutory
language to find whether ‘occupying’ starts at actual possession or
extends to the moment someone holds the present legal right of
possession.
B. What has the Legislature Said About Plain Meaning and the
Intent of Lockout Actions?
In Minnesota, Chapter 645 controls the interpretation of
language contained in statutes and rules.83 When certain words and
phrases have a specific meaning written into a statute by the
legislature, that definition controls. 84 A specific meaning of
residential tenant was written into a statute by the legislature.
Residential tenant is defined as a person who is occupying a
dwelling in a residential building under a written or oral lease or
contract requiring the payment of money or an exchange of
services. 85 However, there is no statutory definition to the word
‘occupying.’
If there is no specific meaning written into a statute by the
legislature, words and phrases are construed according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 86
However, technical words and phrases and such others as have
acquired a special meaning, are construed according to such special
meaning or definition.87 Occupying was construed by the dissent
and every other judicial officer below according to its common and
81. Id. at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (noting Cocchiarella sought a similar
remedy to force Driggs out).
83. Minn. Stat. ch. 645 (2017).
84. Minn. Stat. § 645.01, subd. 1 (2017).
85. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017).
86. Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2017).
87. Id.
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approved usage.88 They believed that to occupy residential property
means that you must have actual physical possession of the
property. I believe this interpretation is correct because it is the
meaning innately assigned to the word ‘occupying,’ as was
evidenced by every judicial officer from the lower courts
unanimously adopting such an interpretation. However, the
Cocchiarella majority disagreed and found ‘occupying’ had
acquired a special meaning which extended to the legal right of
occupancy, even if you had no physical possession.
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature and to give
effect to all its provisions.89 When the words of a law are clear and
free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law is not to be disregarded
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.90 A statute is ambiguous only
when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.91 If a
statute is not ambiguous, the words of the statute should be
interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning.92
To support their conflicting interpretations of the word
‘occupying,’ all of the justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court
reached for their dictionaries and found support for their particular
viewpoint. However, none of the justices ever found that any part
of the statute in question was ambiguous. If the statute was not
found to be ambiguous, then why use dictionaries to define a word
or reach a particular interpretation? This question is more vexing
considering how both interpretations of ‘occupying’ are argued to
be reasonable by the majority and the dissent of the Cocchiarella
opinion.
The statutes involved in a lockout petition clearly state that only
tenants who are occupying an apartment have standing,93 yet there
is no statutory definition of what it means to occupy. However, as
Justice Anderson pointed out in dissent, the legislature did express
their specific intent with regards to lockout actions.94 The lockout
statute states its specific purpose is to provide an additional and
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628, 633 (Anderson J., dissenting).
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2017).
Id.
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629 (Anderson J., dissenting).
Id.
See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017).
Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 632 (Anderson J., dissenting).
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summary remedy for residential tenants unlawfully excluded or
removed from rental property.95 That means a lockout action is not
the only remedy available to tenants those who lose their security
deposit to unscrupulous landlords, such as Cocchiarella, because
they can pursue other remedies such as a conciliation claim or a civil
suit.96 While those options may lead to a longer, more difficult road,
this was the intent of the legislature.
A lockout was meant, by the legislature, as an extraordinary
remedy only for those few who have been living somewhere but are
unlawfully locked out by their landlords. The majority’s broad
interpretation renders the purpose of the lockout statute
meaningless. More confoundingly, the majority argues legislative
intent cannot be explored because the statute is not ambiguous,97
yet the majority also engages in interpretation of the statute’s
language, which should only be done to resolve an ambiguity.98
C. How Often are Dictionaries Used by the Minnesota Supreme
Court to Determine Plain Meaning?
Judge Harold Leventhal once said, and Justice Scalia has
repeated, the use of legislative history is “the equivalent of entering
a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests
for one's friends,” allowing judges to pick the evidence that best
supports their policy preferences.99 The use of dictionaries, too, can
be manipulated in this manner as the problems include arbitrary and
arguably even biased selection of dictionaries by judges, lack of
determination about the qualifications of a particular dictionary, and
failure to account for context when using a dictionary to define a
single term. 100 The renowned jurist Judge Learned Hand once
cautioned about using dictionaries in judicial decision-making:
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense,
are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract,
95. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 5 (2017).
96. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 628, fn. 5.
98. Id. at 624.
99. Phillip Rubin, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in
Accordance With Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167,168 (2010).
100. See supra note 99.
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or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.101

No matter how well respected a jurist, nor how noble a warning,
Judge Hand’s eloquent words of wisdom have fallen upon deaf ears.
Over the last three decades, the United States Supreme Court's use
of dictionaries in its published opinions has increased
dramatically. 102 Although the Court has consulted dictionaries
almost since its inception, before 1864, the Court used dictionaries
as authorities only three times.103 In the quarter-century between
1958 and 1983, the Court cited dictionaries 125 times—an average
of only five times per term.104
By alarming contrast, in the six Terms between 1987 and 1992,
the Court has never cited dictionaries fewer than fifteen times per
term, hitting a high point of thirty-two references during the 1992
Term alone. 105 Dictionary definitions appeared in twenty-eight
percent of the 107 Supreme Court cases decided by published
opinion in the 1992 Term—a fourteen-fold increase over the 1981
Term. 106 The Court has referred to twenty-seven different
dictionaries since 1988 in cases involving not only statutes, but also
constitutional provisions and administrative codes.107
Closer to home, our local court of last resort, the Minnesota
Supreme Court, used dictionaries in 30 108 out of 108 published
opinions in 2015, 109 in 30 110 out of 124 published opinions in

101. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
102. See supra note 99 p. 168 (citing infra note 104 pp. 1438–42 (detailing the
increased reliance by the Supreme Court on dictionaries, focusing in particular
on the 1988–1992 Terms)).
103. See supra note 99 p.168.
104 . Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1438-9.
108 . https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “dictionary” then apply filter for
Minnesota Supreme Court then sort by date) (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
109. 2015 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 52.
110. See supra note 108.
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2016, 111 and in 29 112 out of 104 published opinions in 2017. 113
These statistics illustrate the Minnesota Supreme Court uses
dictionaries to support its reasoning in 25-30% of its written
opinions.114 This ratio falls closely in line with the United States
Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries.115
Even just within the Cocchiarella opinion, the majority used
two dictionaries to support their conclusions while the dissent used
five, including a newer version of one dictionary cited by the
majority.116 As discussed earlier, all of the justices reached for their
dictionaries to find support for their conflicting interpretations of
the word ‘occupying.’ Importantly, the justices did so without
declaring any statutory language to be ambiguous, even though they
advanced two distinct definitions which each side argued to be more
reasonable than the other.
The legislature requires that when the words of a law are not
explicit, the intent of the legislature may be ascertained by
considering (1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the
circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be
remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law, if any;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the
contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) the legislative and
administrative interpretations of the statute. 117 Notably missing
from this list are dictionaries. There is nothing wrong, per se, with
using dictionaries to identify the general outlines of word meanings
and then relying on contextual arguments from text, structure,
history, or policy to determine which meaning is appropriate. 118

111. 2016 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 53.
112. See supra note 108.
113. 2017 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 54.
114 . Calculated using only the numbers cited in the sentence immediately
preceding this one.
115. See supra note 104.
116. Compare Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625-6 (pointing to the American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) and Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)), with Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629-31 (Anderson
J., dissenting) (pointing to a newer edition of the American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language (5th ed. 2011), amongst others)).
117. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2017).
118. See supra note 104 at 1452.
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However, the use of dictionaries should be at the beginning, rather
than at the end of the interpretive process.119
To be fair, the majority correctly went further in their analysis
than the dictionary definitions. However, as Justice Anderson points
out in dissent, ‘occupying’ is hardly a technical or legalistic word,
whose common and ordinary meaning is easily discerned. 120 More
troubling, the majority incorrectly relied on a common law meaning
and the dictionary definition of ‘tenancy’ to support its broader
interpretation that ‘occupying’ had acquired a technical meaning.121
Because residential tenant is defined by statute, the court needed to
look no further than the statutory definition, as the lower courts
correctly restrained themselves to do, to determine whether a
residential tenancy exists, including what it means to ‘occupy.’122
The only exception is when a particular term was found to be
ambiguous, which no justice found to be the case in Cocchiarella.
D. Can’t the Minnesota Supreme Court Just do What It Wants?
As a court of last resort, the Minnesota Supreme Court possesses
powers not delegated to courts below.123 However, even the powers
of the highest court in Minnesota are bound by rules, such as those
which inform others of when the court may hear a case. 124 In
Cocchiarella, there were no differences of opinion below which
required the Minnesota Supreme Court’s guidance, whether at the
housing court, the reviewing district court, or the court of appeals.125
The Court is empowered to hear cases under broad authority
because it serves as the final guardian of the state constitution.126
However, at least in Cocchiarella, the Court did not make it clear
why this case was reviewed. If the Court wanted to provide
119. Id.
120. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 630-31 (Anderson J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 631 (Anderson J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Minn. Const. art. VI § 2.
124. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117, subd. 2.
125. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628 (Anderson J., dissenting).
126. Minnesota Supreme Court, MNCOURTS.GOV, Informational Brochure,
January 2018, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/
CIOMediaLibrary/DocumentLibrary/SupremeCourt.pdf53.
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheImportanceofPrecedent.html. (last visited
Mar. 31, 2018).

Spring 2018]

Moreno

71

Cocchiarella with a fair outcome, why not just come out and say so?
The Court has tools at their disposal to help it support a narrow
decision, such as relying on their constitutional authority as a coequal branch of government to interpret what the laws mean 127 or
by issuing an order opinion.128
No matter what their purpose was, the opinion of the five
members of the Cocchiarella majority trumped that of three district
court judicial officers, three appellate court judicial officers, and
two supreme court judicial officers with similar backgrounds,
training, and experience who had also looked at the same laws and
found there was no standing unless you had physically occupied the
premises. 129 Of particular note is that amongst these were two
housing court referees, experts in landlord-tenant law and related
issues, who both reached the same conclusion.130
The direction coming from courts of review should be clear and
consistent, so all below can anticipate how future controversies will
be resolved. 131 Trial courts are bound by the same principle to a
lesser extent since their decisions are not binding precedent for other
courts. Trial courts also depend on courts of review to provide solid,
detailed reasoning. This is because lower courts are duty-bound to
give full effect to opinions descending from higher courts and there
is often no mechanism delineated for implementation of the higher
court’s opinion. Moreover, the words from a court of review opinion
are carefully parsed by attorneys, litigants, the media, and the
public. The higher courts’ opinions will impact the practice of law
before the lower court where the case on review originated. The
127. See Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992)
(ruling, en banc without oral argument, that a statute was unconstitutional because
it encroached on the judiciary’s power to decide who may properly practice law
before the courts of this state, a power vested solely upon the judiciary by the
Minnesota Constitution).
128. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136, subd. 1.
129. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628-33. (5-2 decision) (Anderson, J.
dissenting).
130. See Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 1(a) (2017) (stating that the purpose of
the housing court program is to ensure continuity and consistency in the
disposition of landlord-tenant law cases); see also Id., subd. 3 (requiring a
housing court referees to be learned in landlord-tenant law).
131. Edward Richards, The Importance of Precedent, LSU LAW CENTER, (last
visited Jan. 13, 2018), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/
TheImportanceofPrecedent.html.
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more uncertain the reasoning of a court of review opinion, the
greater the potential for harm in trying to implement those opinions
in courts below.
There were several alternatives to using dictionaries which
would have provided more solid reasoning. For example, the Court
could have found current Minnesota law doesn’t resolve the
question before the Court, but other states have resolved similar
questions and adopted their reasoning.132 The Court could have also
relied on national resources such as URLTA 133 which aim to
standardize housing laws. There is greater predictability achieved
by these alternatives because we can look to other stable sources of
law and search them for support in adopting a new legal principle
in Minnesota.
To be fair, Minnesota is not the only state to define occupancy
as either actual possession or present legal right of possession.134
But one of the greater problems with the reasoning in Cocchiarella
is not only the direction the law was moved but also the way it was
moved and its effect on predictability. In the past, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not been coy about adopting new legal
principles from model codes but rejecting specific provisions, 135

132. See Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973) (analyzing how other
jurisdictions handled an issue which was of first impression before the Minnesota
Supreme Court in what turned out to be a landmark landlord-tenant opinion which
still strongly anchors housing law practice today regarding the covenants of
habitability and when a tenant is excused from owing rent).
133. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 1.301 (defining
tenant),
2.103
(comment),
(last
visited
Jan.
13,
2018),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20te
nant/urlta%201974.pdf (providing support for the conclusions the Cocchiarella
majority ultimately reached by defining tenant as “a person entitled under a rental
agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others” and by explaining
it is possible both landlord and tenant may have the [simultaneous] right of action
against third parties wrongfully in possession of premises by summary
proceedings, where appropriate).
134. P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally Entitled to Possession
to Dispossess Tenant Without Legal Process IV. Remedies of Tenant, 6 A.L.R.3d
177 (Originally published in 1966).
135. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal
Code, (2013) Symposium: 50th Anniversary of the Minnesota Criminal CodeLooking Back and Looking Forward. Paper 4. (discussing how the 1963 Model
Penal Code’s mens rea section was one of its most significant innovations, yet
Minnesota has refused to adopt it).
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adopting other states’ legal principles but carving out nuances,136 or
rejecting its long-standing legal principles. 137 However, in those
opinions, the Court gave well-founded reasons for each movement
of the law. By contrast, the majority’s reasoning in Cocchiarella
was squarely anchored on dictionaries to justify the introduction of
a new legal fiction — that someone who never lived in an apartment
is still occupying that apartment.
E. A Quick Word on Legal Fictions
To borrow reasoning from the Cocchiarella majority, MerriamWebster defines legal fiction as “something assumed in law to be
fact irrespective of the truth or accuracy of that assumption.” 138
However, Encyclopedia Britannica Online gives a more contextual
definition: “legal fiction is a rule assuming as true something that is
clearly false. A fiction is often used to get around the provisions of
constitutions and legal codes that legislators are hesitant to change
. . .”139 Black’s Law Dictionary is not as helpful, but cites some
interesting literature:
“I . . . employ the expression ‘Legal Fiction’ to signify any
assumption which conceals . . . the fact that a rule of law has
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation
being modified . . . it is not difficult to understand why fictions in all
their forms are particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They
satisfy the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the
same time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for
change which is always present.” Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law 21–
22 (17th ed. 1901).
“Legal fiction is the mask that progress must wear to pass the faithful
but blear-eyed watchers of our ancient legal treasures. But though
136. See Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013)
(adopting loss of chance doctrine as a measure of damages, rather than through
relaxed causation, after seemingly rejecting the same doctrine outright— in any
form— just 10 years earlier in Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993)).
137. See Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000)
(rejecting the long-standing requirement that a court must dismiss a case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction in favor of a “modern view”).
138. Legal Fiction, Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriamwebster.com/legal/legal%20fiction (last visited on Feb. 8. 2018).
139. Legal Fiction, Encyclopedia Brittanica Online,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/legal-fiction (last visited on Mar. 31. 2018).
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legal fictions are useful in thus mitigating or absorbing the shock of
innovation, they work havoc in the form of intellectual confusion.”
Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order 126 (1933).140

Professor Peter J. Smith defines legal fictions as false statements
by a court, not intended to deceive, but necessary in the age of
common law to temper the disruptive effect of changes in legal
doctrine. 141 The new legal fiction adopted by the majority’s
reasoning in Cocchiarella — that someone who never lived in an
apartment is still occupying that apartment — was also not meant
to deceive. However, many of the latent purposes for employing
the use of legal fiction enumerated in this section seem to apply.
F. So Dictionaries and Legal Fiction Aside, Why is Determining
Present Legal Right of Possession a Problem?
The process involved in determining present legal right of
possession in a lockout action requires trial courts to read the
petition and make an immediate determination. 142 This initial
determination must be without hearing or testimony.143 The Court
must find whether the landlord or the tenant currently holds the
present legal right to control/occupy the rental property.144 At first
glance, this process seems similar to the steps trial courts are already
performing in their most common type of landlord-tenant cases:
eviction actions.145 However, lockout actions are markedly different
from eviction actions in at least one significant way. Eviction
actions start with the issuance of a summons 146 which must be
served on the opposing parties following strict compliance with

140. Legal Fiction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014).
141. Peter J. Smith, Faculty Scholarship, New Legal Fiction, 95 GEO L. J. 1435,
1437 (2007) (providing an excellent analysis of the modern use of legal fictions
in an age of positive law).
142. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c) (2017).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145 . See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2017) (defining eviction as a
summary proceeding whose sole purpose trial court’s interpret to be to determine
only the extant possessory rights to property).
146. See Id.
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procedures147 and then the parties must wait for an initial hearing
before the merits of the case will be weighed. By contrast, lockout
actions start by weighing the merits of the case, before service or
opportunity to be heard is given to the opposing party.148
While trial court judicial officers are trained, skilled, and
experienced in making such difficult, immediate decisions, even
trial courts need to moor all decision-making upon solid ground for
“public institutions and the State are legitimate to the extent that
their decisions are justified by reasons.” 149 To help illustrate the
time limitations placed on judicial officers in making such
decisions, here is a joke.
Three judges go on a duck hunt together: an appellate court
judge, a Supreme Court justice, and a trial court judge. First, the
appellate court judge sees what looks like a bird approaching.
Before taking a shot, the appellate court judge wanted to look at a
treatise to be sure it was a duck — but by the time he found the
answer, the duck was out of range. The Supreme Court justice saw
the next bird, but wanted to confer with colleagues and research the
available precedents before shooting — unfortunately, by then the
duck was long gone. Suddenly, the trial court judge heard what he
thought was a bird and immediately aimed and fired. “I sure hope
that was a duck!” he exclaimed.150
Some say there is a grain of truth to every joke. One of the truths
the duck joke illustrates is that trial courts, by design, make
decisions much faster than courts of review and, often, without as
much time to contemplate each case or anyone’s citation to legal
precedent.151 Embedded within the fast proceedings of trial courts,
147. Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (review denied)
(finding statute governing service of process in eviction actions requires strict
compliance, not merely substantial compliance).
148. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c).
149. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483. 485 (2015) (delving
deeply into the underlying analyses, contrasting philosophies, and practical
problems judges face when choosing whether and how much to explain).
150. Judge Mel Dickstein, How Judges Make Decisions, MinnPost (Sep. 9,
2014), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2014/09/how-judgesmake-decisions.
151. See supra note 150. See also supra note 111 pp. 26, 51, 53 (reporting
1,292,494 cases were filed in trial courts throughout Minnesota’s 87 counties and
decided by their 346 judicial officers; 1,963 petitions for review were filed in the
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certain specialized (or ad hoc) courts were created to address
specific subject matters.152 In 1989,153 two such specialized courts
were created in each of Minnesota’s two most populous counties154
to expeditiously resolve housing issues using summary
proceedings. 155 Both the creation and use of ad-hoc courts and
summary proceedings to quickly resolve landlord-tenant cases
follows a modern nationwide trend. 156 This modern trend emerged
to disincentivize landlords from pursuing self-help evictions.157
Minnesota’s two specialized housing courts serve Hennepin and
Ramsey Counties 158 and together handle about half of the state’s
landlord-tenant law cases.159 The two housing courts operate under
a special subset of court rules (known as the housing court rules)
which only apply to landlord-tenant proceedings held in those two
ad-hoc courts. 160 In order to expedited housing court cases further,
the housing court rules waive many rules of court and civil
procedure, such as allowing non-attorney agents to represent others
state’s single court of appeals and decided by its 19 judges; and 765 petitions for
review were filed in the state’s single supreme court and decided by its 7 officers);
Sep. 2017 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANN. REP. (reporting
how quickly the three levels of Minnesota courts disposed of their cases); but see
Minnesota
Court
of
Appeals,
MINN.
JUD.
BRANCH
http://www.mncourts.gov/CourtOfAppeals.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2018)
(explaining the 90-day deadline for Court of Appeals opinions is the shortest
deadline imposed on any appellate court in the nation).
152 . Minn. Stat. ch. 484 (2017) (controlling district court operations and
creating, for example, an expedited child support hearing process, family courts,
housing courts, and misdemeanor violation bureaus).
153 . Rachel S. Lipkin, When the Poor Face Housing Court, CENTER FOR
URBAN AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, 7, (last visited Jan. 20, 2018),
http://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/cura.advantagelabs.com/files/publications/23-4Lipkin.pdf.
154. Minnesota State Demographic Center, Key Findings, MN.GOV (Apr. 1,
201),
https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by-topic/population-data/ourestimates/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017).
155. Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 3 (2017).
156. Randy Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary
Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help,
41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 785-6 (1994).
157. Id.
158. Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 1 (2017); Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601.
159. See 2x4 Report, March 2016, MINN. HOUSING P’SHIP,
http://www.mhponline.org/images/stories/docs/research/2x4/2x4-Tabloid2016_Letter_Final.pdf.
160. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601-612.

Spring 2018]

Moreno

77

and allowing any motion to be made orally, including on the day of
trial.161 Owing in no small part to the use of ad-hoc courts, summary
proceedings, and the housing court rules, most housing court cases
are closed within 14 days of filing.162 More than 90% of housing
court cases are consistently closed within 30 days, 97% within 60,
and 99% within 120.163 Such lightning-quick litigation, embedded
within the already fast proceedings of Minnesota’s trial courts,164
stretches the strength of the Cocchiarella majority’s reasoning to its
limits.
G. Impact on the Practice of Landlord-Tenant Law as Seen
Through Hennepin County Housing Court
Hennepin County Housing Court serves as the forum for
landlord-tenant cases in Minnesota’s most populous county.165 Not
surprisingly, Hennepin County also contains the most residential
housing rental units of any county in the state.166 “Housing market
analysts generally consider a vacancy rate of 5% of rental units to
be a healthy level, allowing for sufficient choice for renters and
allowing turnover to proceed smoothly at a normal rate. Vacancy
rates in a majority of Minnesota communities are below this level,
even falling below 1% in some markets.”167 In the second quarter
of 2015, the apartment vacancy rate in the Minneapolis metropolitan
area was 2.7 percent and the average asking rent was $1,077 per

161. See Id. 603, 610.
162. 2016 MINNEAPOLIS INNOVATION EVICTIONS REP. 21.
163. Id.
164. Bill Hudson, Cameras Capture the Fast Pace of Minn. Housing Court,
WCCO
CBS
MINNESOTA
(May
23,
2012,
6:48
PM),
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/cameras-capture-the-fast-pace-ofminn-housing-court/.
165 . See supra note 159 (reporting 18,280 evictions filed in Minnesota in
2015); 2017 SECOND JUD. D. HOUSING CT. REP. OF OPPORTUNITIES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (reporting an average of 3,000 evictions per year have
been filed in recent years in Ramsey County); See also supra note 162 p. 22
(reporting 6,061 eviction cases were filed in Hennepin County in 2015).
166. Id.
167. Karen Spitzfaden, Review and Summary of Local Housing Studies, (Dec.
2014)
MINN.
HOUSING
FINANCE
AGENCY.
Discussion
paper.
http://www.mnhousing.gov/wcs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1358904870907&pagen
ame=External%2FPage%2FEXTStandardLayout.
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month.168 Affordable housing, in particular, is in desperately short
supply and the problem has worsened.169 Therefore, the residential
rental market in Hennepin County is primed with incentives to keep
rental properties occupied, costs be damned.
1. Potential abuses when a tenant is about to be legally evicted.
A tenant will lose the present legal right of possession if they do
not prevail in an eviction action. There are many reasons landlords
could file eviction actions and the possible defenses greatly
outnumber the basis for eviction actions. 170 However, evictions
alleging nonpayment of rent are by far the most common.171
In a nonpayment of rent eviction action, a tenant has a right to
pay the money owed to the landlord, or redeem the tenancy, at any
time before possession is legally delivered to the landlord.172 The
Minnesota courts of review have found the right of a tenant to
redeem the tenancy is foreclosed upon issuance of an order for writ
of recovery. 173 This means a tenant may no longer redeem the
tenancy once a writ has been issued by the court. This principle
creates a situation where a tenant is still occupying the property, the
tenant has lost the right to redeem the tenancy, but the clock is
ticking until the sheriff executes the writ of recovery and restores
landlord to actual possession of the property. While this principle
168. Gabriel Labovitz, Housing Market Profiles, (July 1, 2015), U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV.
https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/USHMC/reg/MinneapolisMN_HMP_July
15.pdf.
169. Kelly Smith, New Effort Aims to Save Affordable Housing in Hennepin
County, Metro Area, STAR TRIBUNE (June 18, 2016, 1:12 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/new-effort-aims-to-save-affordable-housing-inhennepin-county-metro-area/383489061/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
170. Lawrence McDonough, Residential Eviction Defense and Tenant Claims
in Minnesota, Sixteenth Edition, (Jan. 2018),
http://povertylaw.homestead.com/files/Reading/Residential_Eviction_Defense_i
n_Minnesota.htm (providing an exhaustive and excellent resource for
understanding which defenses are apposite to the different basis for evictions).
171. Alan F. Pendleton, Housing Court-Evictions: 12 Basic Rules Every Judge
Must Know, MINN. JUD. TRAINING UPDATE (Nov. 21 2014),
https://blogpendleton.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/judicial-training-update-1422.pdf.
172. Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a) (2017).
173. Paul McCusker and Associates, Inc. v. Omodt, 359 N.W.2d 747, 748
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (review denied).
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only speaks directly to a tenant’s right to redeem the tenancy, does
this also mean a tenant loses present legal right of possession after
a writ of recovery is issued? More importantly, doesn’t this
principle place tenants at risk of being victimized by vindictive
landlords174 who may argue that such a tenant may have lost present
legal right of possession?175
This was the set of circumstances presented by the case of Jones
v. Meldahl. 176 In Jones v. Meldahl, a tenant filed an emergency
petition under the tenant remedies act177 alleging the landlord shut
off the heat to force her to move out of the unit.178 When the tenant’s
attorney contacted the landlord, the landlord denied knowing the
tenant or that she lived there. 179 During the initial hearing,
Landlord’s attorney moved for dismissal on the basis tenant no
longer had a present legal right of possession because a Writ of
Recovery had issued on October 30, 2017, in an eviction action.180
Landlord relied on the premise that “possession is delivered . . .
when the court issues an order dispossessing the tenant and
permitting reentry by the landlord.”181 While the court did not find
landlord’s argument persuasive,182 and ultimately found landlord’s
conduct was unlawful because he did not resort to the judicial
process to terminate tenant’s leasehold interest, 183 this illustrates
just one of the many ways savvy attorneys will wield the words
passed down to us from courts of review in ways that will help their
clients.

174. See supra note 17.
175. Id.
176. Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov.
6, 2017).
177. Minn. Stat. § 504B.381 (2017).
178. Petition for Emergency Relief Under Tenant Remedies Act at 2, Jones v.
Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 6, 2017).
179. Id.
180. Decision and Order on Petition for Emergency Relief Under Minn. Stat. §
504B.381 at 3, Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist.
filed Nov. 22, 2017).
181. Id. (citing Omodt, 359 N.W.2d at 748).
182. Decision and Order on Petition for Emergency Relief Under Minn. Stat. §
504B.381 at 4, Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist.
filed Nov. 22, 2017).
183. Id. at 5, (citing Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978)).
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2. What if the right to deliver present legal right of possession is
missing?
Sometimes a landlord does not actually hold present legal right
of possession to deliver to a tenant, but the tenant does not know
that and sometimes neither does the landlord.
a. When the tenant is unaware that present legal right of possession
did not transfer to them.
In Wilson v. Doe, 184 a landlord filed an eviction against two
unknown occupants of a rental dwelling alleging no lease between
the parties ever existed.185 The tenant filed an answer alleging she
did not know the plaintiff to be the landlord of the property and the
real landlord had provided her with a written lease and receipts of
rent paid.186 Following a court trial, the court found: (1) plaintiff
was the actual owner of the property, had listed it for sale, and
installed a lock box with a key;187 (2) the code for the lockbox was
given out to approximately 20 agents for showings;188 (3) the tenant
entered a lease agreement with Heraldo Salinas, an unknown
individual, who claimed ownership of the property; 189 (4) Mr.
Salinas was not an owner, manager, or agent of the property and had
no authority to rent the property;190 (5) tenant claimed Mr. Salinas
delivered the keys, a lease, and receipts to her upon signing a lease
agreement 191 and paying him 2-months’ rent; 192 (6) tenant was

184. Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov.
3, 2017).
185 . Eviction Action Complaint at 2, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278
(Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017).
186. Answer at 3, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist.
filed Nov. 15, 2017).
187 . Eviction Action Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Judgment at 1, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed
Dec. 26, 2017).
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Defendant Jane Doe’s Closing Argument and Affidavit at 1, Wilson v.
Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 20, 2017).
192. Id. at 3.
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never able to contact Mr. Salinas again;193 (7) tenant was defrauded
by an unknown person;194 and (8) tenant had unlawfully or forcibly
occupied or taken possession of real property and never held present
legal right of possession.195 The court determined the tenant never
had a valid lease agreement with the lawful owners of the
property196 and the tenant was therefore evicted.197
This case never involved a lockout petition.198 However, if the
tenant had been locked out by the real owner, the tenant could have
then filed a lockout petition. The tenant could have included a copy
of the lease given to her by the impostor landlord. Under such set of
facts, the court would have issued an ex parte order199 directing the
sheriff to ensure possession was restored to the tenant.200 Such an
ex parte order would be valid in spite of the tenant never holding
present legal right of possession. While the court could later correct
the issue of possession, this particular set of facts would have been
problematic under either the majority’s present legal right of
possession approach or the dissent’s actual-possession approach.
This set of facts also illustrates why the extraordinary remedies
available through the lockout statute should only be cautiously
dispensed to those who can claim actual possession and not made
readily available to anyone who only claims to hold present legal
right of possession.201

193 . Eviction Action Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Judgment at 2, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed
Dec. 26, 2017).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.at 4.
198. But see Police Report at 1-3, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 15, 2017) (stating police responded to a call of a
burglary in progress once landlord’s realtor realized there were unauthorized
occupants inside the house).
199. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c) (2017) (stating that if it clearly
appears from the specific grounds and facts stated in the petition that the
exclusion or removal was unlawful, the court shall immediately order that the
residential tenant have possession of the premises).
200. Id.
201. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (offering
that such controversies are better suited for a civil lawsuit where both parties may
be heard and the relevant disputes resolved).
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b. When the landlord is unaware that present legal right of
possession did not transfer from them.
In three separate tenant remedies actions,202 hundreds of tenants
are in danger of simultaneous eviction because their landlords’
rental licenses were revoked 203 or denied 204 by the City of
Minneapolis. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs asked the court to
appoint an administrator to step in and act as a temporary
landlord.205 The plaintiffs claim the City of Minneapolis is willing
to issue a provisional rental license to an administrator in order to
keep tenants in their apartments. If an administrator is not
appointed, a Minneapolis landlord who lacks a valid rental license
may not allow any rental building to be occupied and cannot collect,
accept, or retain rent from any unlicensed rental buildings.206 Any
unlicensed rental buildings must be ordered to be vacated by the
City of Minneapolis.207 However, some of the landlords claim to
still hold valid rental licenses, although the City of Minneapolis
clearly claims otherwise.

202. Aguilar & Violante v. Misco Holdings, LLC, 27-CV-HC-17-5281 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017); IX of Minneapolis v. Khan, 27-CV-HC17-5608 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 21, 2017); City of Minneapolis v.
Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, et al, 27-CV-HC-17-6130 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th
Dist. filed Dec. 22, 2017).
203. Max Nesterak, Lack of Affordable Housing has Tenants Fighting to Stay
in Problem Landlord's Properties, MPR NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:06 AM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/12/22/lack-of-affordable-housing-hastenants-fighting-to-stay (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting the landlord lost his
license to all 42 of his rental properties and the city is forced to vacate all affected
buildings by Feb. 28).
204 . Randy Furst, Minneapolis Denies Rental Licenses for 16 Apartment
Buildings,
STAR
TRIBUNE
(Nov.
8,
2017,
10:20
AM),
http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-is-refusing-to-grant-rental-licensesfor-16-apartment-buildings-sold-by-steve-frenz/456210543/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2018).
205. See Petition, Aguilar & Violante v. Misco Holdings, LLC, 27-CV-HC-175281 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017); See Petition, IX of
Minneapolis v. Khan, 27-CV-HC-17-5608 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov.
21, 2017); See Petition, City of Minneapolis v. Equity Residential Holdings,
LLC, et al, 27-CV-HC-17-6130 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Dec. 22, 2017).
206. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, ch. 244, art. XVI, §
244.1810 (a) (Dec. 11, 2017).
207. Id. at § 244.1970.

Spring 2018]

Moreno

83

The lack of a valid rental license bars landlords from allowing
rental buildings to be occupied—effectively preventing them from
delivering actual possession or granting present legal right of
possession to any tenants—because an unlicensed landlord does not
have the ability to create a legal tenancy during any period of time
they lack a rental license.208 A Minneapolis landlord who lacks a
valid rental license may not even allow any rental building to be
occupied by a tenancy at will—where the tenant holds possession
by permission of the landlord but without a fixed end date—because
the Minneapolis code bars a landlord who lacks a valid rental
license from allowing any rental building to be occupied.209
What if Driggs did not have a valid rental license, but he did not
know it, and neither did Cocchiarella? Cocchiarella’s petition,
under the majority’s new definition, would likely be granted and she
would have an ex parte order to place her in possession of the
property. The court does not have enough information, at the
petition stage, to know that Driggs could not legally transfer either
present legal right of possession nor actual possession.
Any tenant who contracts with a landlord who lacks a rental
license cannot hold either actual possession or a present legal right
of possession, at least in Minneapolis. 210 However, the fact remains
there are hundreds of tenants currently occupying unlicensed rental
buildings. If their tenancies were created by contracting with
unlicensed landlords, then neither the right to hold present legal
right of possession nor actual possession could legally transfer to
the tenants. Many other cities and counties around the state have
similar provisions requiring landlords to obtain either a rental
license or to register rental property,211 so this potential concern is
widespread.
Both the majority and the dissent discussed several
hypotheticals to either support their interpretation or illustrate why
the other interpretation was flawed. Notably, their hypotheticals
were limited only to different lockout scenarios. However, the new
sweeping definition of how residential tenants occupy property
applies to all types of landlord-tenant actions. As the few cases I
208. Id. at § 244.1810 (a).
209. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 13 (2017).
210. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, ch. 244, art. XVI, §
244.1970 (Dec. 11, 2017).
211. See supra note 36.
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discussed illustrate, truth is not only much stranger than fiction, but
also infinitely more complex. Trial courts must determine the truth
quickly and, for lockouts and other emergency tenant actions, ex
parte. The Cocchiarella opinion, by relying on dictionaries to create
a new legal fiction, left the waters very murky for trial courts,
landlords, and tenants to navigate through quickly.212
IV.

CONCLUSION

To say someone who never lived in an apartment is still
occupying an apartment once their move-in date has passed defies
what it means to have something. An actual-possession definition
sets aside all concerns about move-in or move-out dates and places
the focus on who currently lives there. At least for lockout actions,
where the relief is meant to be extraordinary, such a restrained
definition makes sense. For any others, there are still other types of
actions available.
While courts heavily rely on traditions to promote consistency
and trust, the overarching principle of achieving justice needs to be
foremost. This means the courts’ traditions must bend and adapt,
not to the whims and will of the people, but in response to their
needs. But as cases move up the levels of courts, the impact of the
court’s decisions shift dramatically, as they did through
Cocchiarella. If the court expanded a definition to help achieve a
just outcome for this case, it did so at the cost of shifting the ground
for all landlords and tenants throughout the entire state involved in
all kinds of landlord-tenant actions. Whatever their motivations, this
change was not needed, was too broad, and its reasoning too
uncertain for courts to implement effectively.
And what became of Mary Cocchiarella after this ordeal? Much
like the duck joke I mentioned earlier, by the time the Minnesota
Supreme Court announced their land-shifting decision, she had
long-found another place to live.213
“‘Home,’ he mocked gently.
‘Yes, what else but home?
212. See supra note 164.
213. Order for Dismissal, Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Dec. 20, 2016).
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It all depends on what you mean by home.
Of course he’s nothing to us, any more than was the hound that came
a stranger to us out of the woods, worn out upon the trail.’
‘Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to
take you in.’
‘I should have called it something you somehow haven’t to
deserve.’”
— Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, 1914.214

214.

See supra note 1.
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